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ILinking  Brain to Behavior in Normals and Schizophrenics
An  outstanding  problem  in  psychology  and  neuroscience concerns  how  to  link
discoveries about brain mechanisms  to the behaviors that they control. A related problem
in  psychiatry is to  understand how abnormal behaviors arise from  breakdowns in the
brain mechanisms that govern normal  behaviors. During  the past few decades, neural
models have been getting develolJed of  how normal cognitive  and emotional processes
learn from the environment, focus attention and act upon motivationally  important events,
and cope with unexpected events. When arousal or volitional  signals in these models are
suitably altered, they give rise to symptoms that strikingly resemble  negative and positive
symptoms of  schizophrenia, including  flat  affect,  impoverishment of  will,  attentional
problems, loss of  a theory of  mind,  thought derailment, hallucinations, and delusions.
These models thus suggest how an imbalance that is created in otherwise normal  brain
mechanisms can ramify  throughout the brain to create the clinical  symptoms that are
observed.
Another key theme in these models is that constraints on brain development and learning
greatly  constrain  the  kinds  of  information  processing that  govern  both  normal  and
abnormal behaviors. For example, one of these  models is called a CogEM model, because
it joins  together Cognitive,  Emotional,  and Motor  processes  (Grossberg, 1982, 1984b).
The  CogEM  model  tries  to  explain  how emotional  centers of  the brain,  such as the
amygdala,  interact  with  sensory and  prefrontal  cortices  (notably  ventral,  or  orbital,
prefrontal  cortex) to  generate affective  states, attend to  motivationally  salient sensory
events, and elicit motivated behaviors. Closing the feedback loop between cognitive and
emotional  centers is  predicted  to  generate a cognitive-emotional  resonance that  can
support conscious awareness.  When such emotional centers become depressed,  negative
symptoms  of  schizophrenia  emerge  in  the  model  (Grossberg,  1984a,  2000b),  as
summarized below. Such emotional centers are modeled as opponent affective processes,
such as fear and relief,  whose response amplitude and sensitivity  are calibrated by an
arousal level and chemical transmitters that slowly inactivate, or habituate, in an activity-
dependent way.  These opponenl: processes exhibit  an  Inverted-U  whereby  behavior
become depressed  if the arousal level is chosen  too large or too small. Underaroused  and
overaroused depression can be clistinguished clinically  by  their parametric properties.
Negative  symptoms are proposed to  be due to  the  way  in  which  depressed affective
opponent processes interact  with  other circuits,  notably cognitive  and motor circuits,
throughout the brain.
A  related model  suggests how  brain mechanisms of cognitive  learning, attention, and
volition  work,  and  may  give  rise  to  positive  symptoms  like  hallucinations  during
schizophrenia and other mental disorders. This  Adaptive  Resonance theory,  or ART,
model (Grossberg, 1980, 1999b)  proposes an answer  to the "stability-plasticity  dilemma;"
namely, how the brain can learn quickly  throughout life  without  being forced to forget
previously  learned memories just  as quickly.  ART  proposes how normal learning and
memory may be stabilized  throu;gh the use of  learned top-down expectations. In other
words,  we  are "intentional"  beings  so  that  we  can learn  quickly  without  suffering
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2catastrophic forgetting. The:se  expectations learn prototypes that are capable of focusing
attention  upon  the  combinations  of  features  that  comprise  conscious  perceptual
experiences. When top-down expectations are active in a priming  situation in the absence
of  bottom-up information,  they can modulate or sensitize their target cells to respond
more  effectively  to  future  bottom-up  information  that  matches the  prototype.  Such
expectations cannot, however, fully  activate these target cells under most circumstances.
When bottom-up inputs do occur, an active top-down expectation selects the cells whose
input features are consistent with the active prototype, and suppresses  those that are not.
This matching process can synchronize and amplify the activities of selected  cells. Such a
matching  process has  been mathematically  proved  to  be  necessary to  stabilize  the
memory of  learned representations in response to a complex  input  environment (e.g.,
Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991). In order to realize these matching properties, top-down
expectations and attention were predicted to be controlled  by top-down  on-center off-
surround networks.  A  balance between top-down  excitation  and inhibition  in  the on-
center of this network leads to the modulatory effect in the on-center on its target cells,
even  while  cells  that  are  in  the  off-surround  may  be  strongly  inhibited.  Recent
psychophysical and neurophysiological data have supported this prediction;  see Raizada
and Grossberg (2003) for a review.
The  ART  model  proposes how  the  brain  has exploited  the  modulatory  property of
expectations and attention to enable fantasy, imagery, and planning activities to occur. In
particular,  phasic  volitional  signals  can  shift  the  balance  between  excitation  and
inhibition  to favor net excitatory activation when a top-down expectation is active. Such a
volitionally-mediated  shift enables top-down expectations, in the absence  of  supportive
bottom-up  inputs,  to  cause conscious experiences of  imagery and  inner speech, and
thereby to enable fantasy and planning activities to occur. If,  however, these volitional
signals become tonically hY1>eractive  during a mental disorder, the top-down expectations
can give rise to conscious experiences in the absence  of bottom-up inputs and volition.
Many data about schizophrenic hallucinations can be clarified  by these model properties
(Grossberg, 2000a). Related work has predicted the detailed laminar circuits  within  the
visual cortex wherein these top-down expectations and volitional  signals may act, and by
extension in other sensory  and cognitive neocortical areas  (Grossberg, 1999a, Grossberg
and Raizada, 2000; Raizada and Grossberg, 2003). ART  also predicts that the contents
and  level  of  abstractness of  learned  prototypes  may  determine  the  contents  and
abstractness  of hallucinations. A  similar breakdown of volition  may lead to delusions of
control in the motor system.
Attention, Affect, and Volition in Schizophrenia
This CogEM and ART modl~ls  bring a new perspective to thinking  about the well-known
fact that schizophrenia inv()Jves a loss of  attentional control,  motivational  defects, and
disorganized behavior. Kraepelin (1913/1919) early noted that "This  behavior is without
doubt  clearly  related  to  the  disorder  of  attention  which  we  very  frequently  find
conspicuously developed in  our  patients. It  is  quite  common  for  them to  loss  both
inclination  and ability  on their own initiative  to keep their attention fixed  for any length
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of time"  (pp. 5-6). Attentional  deficits  in schizophrenia have also been emphasized by a
number of other workers; e.g., Bleuler (1911/1950), Braff (1985) and Mirsky (1969).
Since the time  of  Kraepelin,  many efforts  have been made to  classify schizophrenic
symptoms across distinct  patient populations,  including  the basic classifications  into
negative and positive  symptoms, or deficit  and nondeficit symptoms (Buchanan et at.,
1997; Bustillo  et at., 1997). Liddle  (1994) has segregated  schizophrenic symptoms into
"three distinguishable syndromes: (1) psychomotor poverty (poverty of speech,  flat affect,
decreased  spontaneous  movement); (2) disorganisation (disorders of the form of thought,
inappropriate affect);  and (3) reality  distortion  (delusions and hallucinations)"  (p. 43),
which have been supported by several studies (Arndt  et at., 1991; Pantelis et at., 1991;
Sauer et at.,  1991). Liddle  suggested that two  of  these syndromes "reflect  volitional
disorders: psychomotor poverty reflects a difficulty  initiating  activity and disorganisation
reflects  a  difficulty  in  the  selection  of  appropriate activity"  (p,  43).  Both  of  these
problems  are, moreover,  associated with  impairment  in  neuropsychological  tests  of
frontal lobe function.
In  a different  direction,  Frith  (1992,  1994) has interpreted schizophrenic symptoms as
impairments  in the processes that underlie a "theory of mind",  including  the ability  to
represent beliefs and intentions.  For example, when asked to describe photographs of
people, schizophrenics described their physical appearance,  rather than their mental states
(Pilowsky  and Bassett, 1980). Frith  noted, however, that the theory of  mind  approach
"does not explain the other major feature of negative schizophrenia: their impoverishment
of will."  (Frith,  1994, p. 150). He also wrote that "mental states  include not only affects
and emotions, but also goals and intentions.  A  person who was unaware of  their goals
could, on the one hand, be a slave to every environmental influence or, on the other hand,
be prone to  perseverative or stereotyped behaviour, because they would  not have the
insight to recognize that certain goals were unobtainable or inappropriate" (Frith,  1994, p.
151).
All  of  these properties have explanations using CogEM and ART.  In  particular, these
models  analyze  how  attention  is  regulated during  normal  cognitive  and  cognitive-
emotional interactions, and how it breaks down when these  normal processes  experience
some sort of imbalance. Such models point to processes  that have not been as actively
considered as they might be towar'ds  explaining schizophrenic behavioral symptoms.
Gated Dipole Opponent  Processing
I
One such process is opponent processing, whether of opponent emotions, like  fear and
relief, or of opponent perceptual  features,  like red and green. Opponent processing  plays a
key  role  in  controlling  the  dynamical  reset and  rebalancing of  sensory, cognitive,
emotional,  and motoric  representations in response to  rapidly changing environmental
inputs. Such opponent processing circuits exhibit a Golden Mean of optimal  behavior at
an intennediate  arousal level  (Grossberg, 11972, 1980,  1984a, 1984b). For  larger or
smaller levels of arousal, behavior deteriorates in different ways, thereby giving rise to an I
4Inverted-U as a function of arousal level. In particular, when arousal  is too small, such an
opponent process causes an elevated behavioral threshold, since there is  not  enough
arousal to support a more normal threshold. Paradoxically, it also gives rise to behavioral
hyperexcitability  when this elevated  threshold is exceeded.  When arousal is too small, the
opponent process causes  a low behavioral threshold. Paradoxically, it also gives rise to
behavioral  hypoexcitability  when  this  reduced threshold  is  exceeded. Due  to  these
properties,  an  increase in  arousal  can decrease the  sensitivity  of  an  underaroused
opponent process of  this kind,  and can bring  it into  the normal behavioral range. The
model proposes that, in this way, a pharmacological "up"  like  amphetamine can reduce
the  hypersensitivity  of  attention  deficit  disorder  children.  These  properties  emerge
through  interactions  across the  entire  opponent processing circuit.  They  cannot  be
understood just  by looking  at the pharmacology or neurophysiology of  individual  cells
within  the  circuit.  How  such opponent processes work  during  normal  behavior  and
schizophrenia  is  described in  Grossberg (1984a,  1984b, 2000b).  When  their  output
signals become depressed, such opponent processes are predicted to  lead to  various
symptoms of flat affect. When their effects ramify throughout the sensory  and prefrontal
cortices  with  which  they interact, they can lead to  all the negative symptoms that are
summarized above.
Negative  Symptoms  as Emergent  Properties  of System-  Wide Interactions
The most immediate effect of a depressed  response  in the outputs of emotion-representing
areas is  flat  affect,  although how this is  understood must be carefully  evaluated; see
below. This defect, in turn, causes  an inability to represent  others' beliefs and intentions,
in  the sense that all  mental states that depend upon interpreting one's  own  emotional
state, or the emotional states of others, will  be diminished. This happens in the CogEM
mode] because  emotionally charged sensory  inputs, such as the emotional expressions on
other people's faces, will  activate the appropriate part of inferotemporal  cortex but will
not  elicit  an appropriate emotional  response from  the amygdala and related emotion-
representing circuits;  see Figure  1. As a result, photos of people would  necessarily be
described physically, rather than in terms of emotionally relevant mental states (Pilowsky
and Bassett, 1980).
Figure 1
A  problem  with  impoverishment  of  will,  as  well  as  with  the  setting  of  goals  and
intentions,  will  then indirectly  arise. This  happens in the model because the depressed
response of the emotional representations  depresses  the incentive  motivational  signals
that would  normally activate the prefrontal cortex in response  to  motivationally  salient
events (Figure 1). As a result, the prefrontal cortex will  not be adequately  activated, and a
h~frontal  condition  will  emerge (Weinberger, 1988). Due to this hypofrontality,  the
working  memory  representations and  plans  that  are  ordinarily  formed  within  the
prefrontal cortex will  be degraded,  so goals will  not form in a normal fashion.
5Given a hypofrontal response,  top-down signals from the prefrontal cortex to the sensory
cortices  will  also  be  reduced  or  eliminated  (Figure  1).  As  a  result,  the  sensory
representations will  not be able to use these top-down signals to organize information-
processing according to  its  emotional meaning or  motivational  goals. Said in  another
way, motivationally  irrelevant information  will  not be blocked from attention, so it wilJ
be  able  to  continualJy intrude,  leading  to  distractability.  Or,  in  Kraepelin's  words,
schizophrenics "lose  both inclination  and ability  on their  own initiative  to  keep their
attention fixed for any length of time."
Neurobiological Correlates
The CogEM  model also clarifies the following  types of anatomical, neurophysiological,
and biochemical data. The amygdala, and related structures, has been identified  in both
animals  and humans to  be  a  brain  region  that is  involved  in  learning  and eliciting
memories of  experiences with  strong emotional  significance  (Aggleton,  1993; Davis,
1994; Gloor et al., 1982; Halgren et al., 1978; LeDoux,  1993). The orbitofrontal  cortex is
known to be a major projection area of the ventral, or object-processing, cortical visual
stream (Barbas, 1995; Fulton, 1950; Fuster, 1989; Rolls, 1998; Wilson  et al., 1993), and
cells in the orbitofrontal  cortex are sensitive to the reward associations  of sensory  cues, as
well  as to  how  satiated the  corresponding drive  is  at  any time  (e.g.,  Mishkin  and
Aggleton,  1981; Rolls,  1998). Ubiquitous  positive  feedback occurs  between cortical
regions (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Macchi and Rinvik,  1976; Sillito  et al.,  1994;
Tsumoto, Creutzfeldt, and Legendy, 1978), including prefrontal and sensory  cortices. In
addition, the ventral prefrontal cortex and the amygdala are involved  in the process by
which  responses are selected on the basis of  their emotional  valence and success in
achieving rewards (Damasio et al., 1991; Passingham,  1997). In particular, Fuster (1989)
has concluded from studies of monkeys that the orbital prefrontal cortex helps to suppress
inappropriate responses.  These monkey data are consistent with  clinical  evidence that
patients with injury to orbital prefrontal cortex tend to behave in an inappropriate manner
(Blumer  and  Benson,  1975;  Liddle,  1994).  Other  research  has  suggested  that
schizophrenia may involve  a chronic deficiency in striatal glutamate transmission due to
decreased activity  in those regions of  the prefrontal  cortex that project to the striatum
(Andreasen,  1990; Carlsson,  1988; Grace,  1991; Lynch,  1992). The  CogEM  model
suggests that one possible cause of decreased  prefrontal  activity  may be a reduction in
incentive  motivational  signals  from  depressed amygdala circuits  that  project  to  the
prefrontal cortex.
I Some  Open Questions  and the Need  For Quantitative Brain/Behavior Models
A brief verbal summary such as I have just attempted leaves out so many details that it is
subject to misinterpretation. In the case of  the CogEM and ART  models, whatever be
their  shortcomings,  they offer  a precise mechanistic explanation  of  how  interactions
among model brain mechanisms  give rise to normal and abnormal behavioral properties.
The  same is  not  true  of  intuitive  and  heuristic  attempts to  explain  schizophrenic
symptoms which, albeit necessary'  to advance our understanding, are inherently too weak I
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Ito  unambiguously bridge  the gap between brain and behavior. The  discussion above
raises a number of questions when it is confronted by various recent data. For example, it
has been proposed that some schizophrenics who  exhibit symptoms of  flat  affect may
experience  more  intense  emotions  than  ordinarily  supposed, particularly  negative
emotions, and that flat affect is due to the fact that their observable  responses  are reduced
(e.g., Alpert et al. 2000). The essential property for explaining the effects of flat affect in
the CogEM model is that a late stage in emotional processing, one that feeds incentive
motivational  signals to the prefrontal cortex, is depressed  and thereby negatively impacts
sensory,  cognitive, and motoric processing.  Earlier stages  of emotional processing may be
intact without disrupting model predictions. This being said, questions remain about how
some of these patients wel~e  tested -in  particular, using verbal stories about emotional
situations is not necessarily  a reliable way to assess  experienced  emotion.
It has been suggested that flat  affect may not be a primary  symptom of schizophrenia
because flat  affect and hallucinations to  not always covary  (Serper et al.,  1996). The
CogEM and ART models clarify, however, that these  two types of symptoms may be due
to distinct brain mechanisms. It has also been suggested  that the early appearance  of flat
affect,  before schizophrenic  symptoms occur,  and the  fact  that  it  is  sometimes not
followed  by such symptoms (Alpert,  1985), may suggest  that it is only a "risk factor"  for
schizophrenia (Alpert and Angrist, 2003). Given that there are many reasons  why an early
symptom may not immediately lead to a fully  blown syndrome, one might just  as well
wonder if  the early onset does not provide  some evidence that it  can be a cause. For
example, autoreceptors  can, in various brain systems, maintain a robust system response
until  such a large loss is experienced that they can no  longer compensate for  it.  Such
compensatory effects  may' be occurring in,  say, the amygdala-to-prefrontal pathways.
Experiments to  study this  and related pathways more closely would  be most valuable
towards clarifying  this issue.
More  generally this articl(~ points to  how well-known  psychological processes such as
affective  opponent processing, top-down expectations, incentive  motivation,  volitional
gating, and attentional blocking  may break down in schizophrenics. Neural models like
CogEM and ART,  by describing these processes  clearly and quantitatively,  may make it
easier  to think about and test their implications when they are subjected to one or another
kind of imbalance.
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1. Figure 1. (a) The simplest  CogEM model:  Three  types  of interacting  representations  (sensory,  drive, and motor)
that control three types of learning (conditioned reinforcer,  incentive  motivational.  and motor) may be used to
explain many learning data. Sensory  representations  temporarily  store internal  representations  of sensory  events.
Drive representations  are sites where  reinforcing and homeostatic.  or drive, cues  converge  to activate emotional
responses.  Motor representations  control the read-out  of actions.  Conditioned  reinforcer  learning (CRL) enables
sensory  events to  activate emotional reactions at drive representations.  Incentive motivational learning (IML)
enables  emotions  to generate  a motivational  set that biases  the system  to process  information  consistent  with that
emotion. Motor learning  allows sensory  and  cognitive  representations  to generate  actions.  In order  to work well. a
I
Isensory representation must have (at least) two successive stages,  so that sensory  events cannot release actions that
are motivationally  inappropriate. These stages  are interpreted as sensory cortex and prefrontal cortex representations
of  the  sensory event. The  prefrontal  stage requires motivational  support from  a drive  representation to  be fully
effective. The amygdala i.s  interpreted as one important part of a drive representation. Amydgala inputs to prefrontal
cortex cause feedback to sensory cortex that selectively amplifies and focuses attention upon motivationally  relevant
sensory events. (b) When a drivl:  representation  like the amygdala gets depressed (gray box), diminished  activation
of  its outputs in response to  sensory events depresses motivational  inputs to the prefrontal  cortex  in response to
emotionally  important events, and hereby attenuates motivationally-appropriate  signals to and from the prefrontal
cortex (dashed lines). As a result, motivationally  irrelevant events are not attentionally  suppressed,  and prefrontaIly-
mediated plans and actions are insufficently activated.